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The paper analyzes the impact of skill-biased migration policies under the eco-
nomics of agglomeration. It therefore develops an agglomeration model with two
types of mobile worker who are heterogeneous and diﬀer both within and between
skill groups with respect to their migration propensity. On the one hand, the model
reveals that the eﬀectiveness of migration policies depends on the level on trade
costs. On the other hand, it shows that increasing (reducing) political barriers to
migration for one factor of production, reduces (increases) the migration incentive
of the other. Consequently, pro-skilled and contra-unskilled migration policies at-
tenuate each other or can even be counterproductive.
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Industrialized countries are moving towards immigration policies that favor inﬂows of
highly skilled labor. This trend becomes manifest in a variety of policy measures. In
the Netherlands and Ireland fast-track visa for specialists facilitate immigration. Canada,
Australia, New Zealand and the UK have adopted (or are about to adopt) a point-based
immigration scheme where potential migrants earn points on the basis of their qualiﬁ-
cations and language skills, their work experience and other personal factors (e.g., age,
education of spouse, existing family ties in the destination country). The score achieved
in the skill assessment helps to identify and to facilitate entry for highly skilled workers.
Other countries, as in the case of Canada, further support the inﬂow of skilled labor by
promoting access to the labor market for their spouses. The current migration policies
of the United States are based on immigration quotas with respect to diﬀerent skill lev-
els. They promote the inﬂow of skilled labor by non-immigrant visa (H1B visa, which
permit a limited duration of stay) or the United States Permanent Resident Card (green
card, which does not restrict the duration of stay). But opinions are voiced to adopt a
point-based immigration scheme, as well (compare Bartlett (2007)).
Most models which stress and analyze the impact of migration are neoclassical. Like an
osmotic process, these models predict migration ﬂows from regions where labor is abun-
dant to regions where it is scarce. Hereby, factor ﬂows change the relative scarcity of
factors of production, competing away diﬀerences in wages so that regions will converge.
But this not necessarily have to be the case. With the development of new trade mod-
els and the seminal core-periphery model by the Nobel laureate Krugman (1991) issues
of the geographical distribution of economic activity have (re-)entered the focus of eco-
nomic interest. Since then, a wave of research has yielded both substantial theoretical
and empirical insights into the causes, the evolution and the consequences of geographical
concentration (see Combes et. al. (2008) and Fujita et. al. (1999) for an overview). But
although many of these model depart from labor mobility, unfortunately only recently
”migration theory now recognizes the beneﬁts of agglomeration” as put by the current
World Development Report (2009). One of the pioneers to realize the relevance of ag-
1glomeration forces in the migration process were Commander et. al. (2004). The authors
oﬀered a ﬁrst re-interpretion of standard new economic geography models and worked out
signiﬁcant contributions with respect to migration theory (or more concisely brain drain)
as there were trade cost dependent migration pressure, uneven development as a natural
phase of world development, and skilled labor emigration being detrimental for those left
behind. However, as this paper will show, agglomeration models have more to oﬀer with
respect to migration theory, especially if there is more than one mobile type of workers
involved. Not only have there been ﬁrst theoretical advances but also empirical evidence
which suggest to consider agglomeration economies as a driving force of migration (see
Fujita et. al. (1999) and Combes et. al. (2008) for critical overviews). Especially the
results by Crozet (2004) and Pons et. al. (2007) are worth mentioning. The authors ﬁnd
that indexes which measure the access to sources of supply are a signiﬁcant determinant
of people’s migration decision. Or stated intuitively, people value agglomeration beneﬁts.
So far, agglomeration models based on labor mobility have been exploited to explain the
patterns of spatial agglomeration and their evolution with respect to the level of economic
integration. These frameworks establish a relation between trade costs and the degree
of spatial agglomeration. They predict dispersion of economic activity at high levels of
trade costs. Economic integration then leads to agglomeration and, depending on the
speciﬁcation of the particular model, to redispersion once trade costs are suﬃciently low.
These models have been fruitful to explain the emergence and the evolution of regional
agglomeration pattern, but due to their basic structure they are not suitable to analyze
the impact of skill-biased migration policies. Although they typically depart from two
factors of production, only one input is assumed to be mobile between regions, whereas
the other factor of production is bound to its region of origin.
This paper develops an agglomeration model with two mobile types of labor, which diﬀer
with respect to their abilities and migration impediments. Taking agglomeration forces
explicitly into account, it addresses the eﬀects of skill-biased migration policies in a setting
where market size plays a role. On the one hand, the model reveals that the eﬀectiveness
of migration policies depends on the level on trade costs. On the other hand, the paper
shows that skill-biased migration policies which discriminate between migrants of diﬀerent
2skill groups attenuate each other and can even be counterproductive with respect to the
initial policy intention.
The contributions of the approach presented here are two-fold:
Firstly, the paper develops an agglomeration model with two types of mobile and hetero-
geneous workers. Here, heterogeneity becomes manifest in two respects. On the one hand,
labor diﬀers with respect to its ability. There are self-employed workers (who are referred
to as skilled labor) and (unskilled) employees, who are employed by ﬁrms. On the other
hand, workers have individual sources of (dis-) utility - be it from heterogeneous prefer-
ences over locations, costs or beneﬁts from being remote from one’s own socio-cultural
surrounding and/or political barriers to migration.
Secondly, the model is used to analyze the impact of skill-biased migration policies under
increasing returns to scale. In standard agglomeration models this has not been feasi-
ble as they depart from only one mobile type of labor. The paper shows that measures
which promote the inﬂow of skilled labor ceteris paribus increase the immigration incen-
tive for unskilled labor. If immigration policies, in turn, artiﬁcially increase migration
impediments for unskilled labor, skilled workers, too, haver fewer incentives to immi-
grate. This is counterproductive to policy measures which aim at increasing immigration
ﬂows of the skilled workforce. These eﬀects seem familiar from neoclassical migration
models, but there are substantial diﬀerences. While in neoclassical models immigration
aﬀects marginal productivities and wages, here individual productivities are held con-
stant. Rather, the fundamental intuition behind changes real wages is the home market
eﬀect. Larger markets attract a larger share of businesses and working places for skilled
labor. Markets with a great number of businesses and ﬁrms attract both skilled and un-
skilled labor. Consequently, migration policies which impede labor to enter the country
keep markets artiﬁcially small and decrease the immigration incentive for both skilled and
unskilled labor. Apart from that, neoclassical approach predict deconcentration, whereas
here labor may migrate where it is already abundant. Hereby, regional asymmetries arise
endogenously from ex ante identical regions.
This paper is not the ﬁrst attempt to analyze the impact of migration impediments in
form of taste heterogeneity and regional preferences under agglomeration economics, but
3it exhibits signiﬁcant diﬀerences to former approaches. Ludema and Wooton (1999) and
Tabuchi and Thisse (2002) have developed agglomeration models with two types of labor
as factors of production. Diﬀerent from here, one of them is immobile between regions,
whereas the other can freely migrate but is heterogeneous with respect to appreciations
of regions. In Murata (2003) there is only one factor of production, which is mobile
between regions. To derive non-trivial result it departs from heterogeneous preferences
over locations, which impede migration movements.
This paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the basic assumptions of the model
and derives the short-run equilibrium for any given distribution of skilled and unskilled
labor. Section 3 is dedicated to the long-run equilibrium of the model and determines
the agglomeration pattern of both skilled and unskilled labor. In section 4, the impact of
skill-biased migration policies is analyzed. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 The basic set-up
There are two countries in the economy named home (H) and foreign (F)1. Both countries
are identical with respect to production technologies and the (initial) endowment of factors
of production. There are two types of households, skilled and unskilled. The world
population of unskilled labor is given by L which is the sum of unskilled labor living
in home (LH) and foreign (LF). The world-wide mass of skilled people is formalized
by K and is composed of skilled people of both regions, KH and KF (the subindex
indicates the region of residence). Each type inelastically supplies one unit of factor
input and receives unskilled wages (W) or skilled wages (R) as income, respectively. This
income is entirely spent for the consumption of goods from which people derive utility.
There are two types of goods. The homogeneous good (A) is produced under perfect
competition with a linear constant returns to scale technology using unskilled labor as
the only input. The homogeneous good can be traded without trade costs and serves as
1The basic set-up departs from Pﬂüger (2004) and Russek (2008).
4the numéraire. Furthermore, there is a set of heterogeneous goods (X) which shall be
called manufacturing goods. Each variety is produced under monopolistic competition
and increasing returns to scale using both skilled and unskilled labor. Unskilled labor is
the only variable factor of production. The marginal input requirement is constant and
is given by c. Furthermore, each ﬁrm needs one unit of skilled labor as ﬁxed input (e.g.,
headquarter services or R&D). Varieties of heterogeneous goods incur trade costs when
traded between the regions, within a region trade is costless.
Both skilled and unskilled labor are assumed to be mobile across regions, but incur costs
when migrating from one region to the other. These costs diﬀer between individuals.
Within one region both types of workers are perfectly mobile between sectors. λ = KH/K
and (1−λ) = KF/K express the share of skilled workers living in home (foreign) in relation
to the world population of skilled workers. The share of unskilled workers residing in home
(foreign) with respect to the world population of skilled labor is denoted by ρ = LH/K
and (ρ − ρ) = LF/K. The parameter ρ = L/K is the world population of unskilled
workers relative to the world population of skilled labor.
2.2 Preferences and demand
Preferences for goods are homogeneous and are given by a logarithmic quasi-linear utility
function. The homogeneous good enters the utility function in the form of the linear
extension, whereas the aggregate of heterogeneous goods enters logarithmically and is
modeled as a CES bundle:














α > 0, σ > 1
CX (CA) is the quantity consumed of the heterogeneous aggregate (homogeneous good),
σ measures the elasticity of substitution between any pair of heterogeneous goods and is
assumed to be greater one. The positive parameter α measures the weight of heteroge-
neous goods in the utility function. xi (xj) represents the per capita consumption of a
5domestic (imported) heterogeneous good. NH and NF stand for the number of domestic
and foreign ﬁrms producing each one variety of the manufacturing good. Households
maximize their utility given the budget constraint deﬁned as follows:












,τ > 1 (2)
P is the optimal CES price index where the price of the domestic (imported) variety is
given by pi (pj). As the homogeneous good is the numéraire, its price is normalized to
one. The parameter τ is greater one and captures the (iceberg) trade costs. The income
per household is given by Y which is W for unskilled and R for skilled labor. Utility
maximization with respect to quantities consumed yields the following demands and the
indirect utility function V :
CX = α/P, CA = Y − α (3)
xi = α p
−σ
i P
(σ−1), xj = α (τpj)
−σ P
(σ−1)
V = Y − αlnP + α(lnα − 1)
To guarantee that both types of goods are consumed, α is assumed to be less than Y .
2.3 Production and short-run equilibrium
The homogeneous good is produced under constant returns to scale and perfect compe-
tition. The production technology of the numéraire is assumed to be linear using a unit
input requirement of unskilled labor. Consequently, the wage of unskilled workers equals
one.
Each variety of the heterogeneous good is produced under increasing returns to scale with
a linear production technology using unskilled labor as variable input. To produce one
unit of the good, c units of unskilled labor is needed. Furthermore, one unit of skilled
labor is required as ﬁxed input to produce at all. Firms serve both the domestic and the
foreign market. Exporting goods incurs trade costs which are formalized by iceberg trade
6costs. Hence, if τx units are sent away, x units arrive at the foreign market. Firms aim
to maximize their proﬁt function Π which for ﬁrm i is given by
Πi = (p
H




i − c)(LF + KF) τx
F
i − Ri (4)
The ﬁrst (second) term on the LHS is the demand of the domestic (foreign) market.
Maximizing proﬁts with respect to the prices pH
i and pF










Equilibrium prices are characterized by a constant mark-up over marginal costs (mill
pricing). Due to free market entry and exit of ﬁrms, proﬁts are zero in equilibrium.
Setting the equilibrium price equal to average production costs reveals the equilibrium





where Xi is the aggregate production of variety i. In equilibrium aggregate production
has to be equal aggregate demand by all skilled and unskilled workers. As prices are given
by Eq. (5), the market clearing condition is uniquely determined by:
Xi =
α(σ − 1)(LH + KH)
σc[KH + φKF]
+
α(σ − 1)(LF + KF)φ
σc[φKH + KF]
(7)
where the RHS of Eq. (7) is the aggregate demand from domestic and foreign consumers.
φ measures the freeness of trade and is commonly given by φ = τ1−σ. If trade costs tend
to inﬁnity, φ tends to zero. If trade is costless, φ is one. As Xi is identical for all ﬁrms i,
the subindex of X and R can be omitted. Substituting Eq. (7) into Eq. (6) and dividing
both the denominator and the enumerator by K yields the equilibrium wage for skilled
workers in region H for any given domestic share of skilled and unskilled labor (for region
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λ + (1 − λ)φ
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1 − λ + ρ − ρ
φλ + 1 − λ
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Once the goods market equilibrium is determined, the labor market equilibrium can be
characterized. The demand for unskilled labor per manufacturing ﬁrm in region H related
to the equilibrium aggregate production X per variety is given by NHcX. Putting Eq. (6)
into this expression yields the following expression for the labor demand of the domestic
manufactoring sector:
L
D = NHRH(σ − 1) (9)
Unskilled workers who are not employed in the manufacturing sector ﬁnd employment
in the homogeneous good sector. The demand for unskilled labor given by Eq. (9) is
assumed to be less than the regional supply of unskilled labor LH so that in either region
both types of goods are produced. Due to unskilled labor mobility the regional supply of
unskilled labor is not exogenously given, but rather arises endogenously. In section 3 it
is shown that the regional supply of unskilled labor is a function of trade costs and the
geographical distribution of skilled workers. Taking into account the mobility of unskilled
labor, the assumption of regional non-specialization is fulﬁlled for any given level of trade
costs and for any geographical distribution of skilled labor whenever α < σ/2(σ − 1) and
ρ > α(σ − 1)/(σ/2 − α(σ − 1)). Furthermore, unskilled labor must not too mobile2.
Substituting equilibrium prices from Eq. (5) into the CES- price index yields:
PH = p
∗[λ + (1 − λ)φ]
1
1−σ PF = p
∗[λφ + (1 − λ)]
1
1−σ (10)
2Due to the analytical expression of the labor supply curve the points of intersection between the
labor supply and demand curve cannot be determined analytically. But as both the labor demand and
the labor supply are increasing in λ, it is possible to focus on λ = {0,0.5,1}. At these points the labor
supply is always greater than the labor demand, if the above parameter restriction hold. Assuming that
matching costs of unskilled labor are not too small ensures that labor supply of unskilled workers is
greater than labor demand for any λ ∈ [0,1].
83 Long-run equilibrium
In the long run, skilled and unskilled labor are mobile across regions, but incur mobility
costs. Following Tabuchi and Thisse (2002), these costs may arise from preferences over
locations, from being remote from one’s socio-cultural surrounding, political obstacles and
other factors of inﬂuence. Consequently, they should be understood as permanent match-
ing costs. The strength of these impediments to migration depends largely on (partially
unobserved) personal characteristics, so that these costs diﬀer between individuals. Het-
erogeneity is modeled by stochastic utility functions which are given by V rsk = Vrs +rsk.
The term V rsk is the perceived utility of person k with ability s (skilled labor is subindex
by λ, unskilled by ρ) in region r, the expression Vrs is given by Eq. (3) and stands for
the indirect utility in region r ∈ [H,F] for skill-level s. rsk is a stochastic component
which accounts for unobserved sources of (dis-)utility of person k and ability s in region
r. Within skill groups, rsk is assumed to be independently Gumbel3 distributed for all
k with a a variance of π2η2/6 and mode msr, which may vary between regions. The
parameter η is a positive scale parameter. π is the circular constant.
A worker of ability s migrates to the region where his perceived indirect utility V rsk is
greatest. This assumes that the migration decision is lead by two major components. On
the one hand individual characteristics, on the other a comparison of real wages. Here,
real wages do not only contain information about wage and price levels (compare Eq.(3))
but also include a measure of access to sources of supply (see Eq. (10)). The latter is
shown to be a signiﬁcant determinant of people’s migration decision (compare Pons et. al.
(2007) and Crozet (2004) for more details). As rsk are independently distributed within
skill groups and only vary with respect to modes, the share of workers of type s in region
H with respect to the corresponding worldwide stock of these workers is determined by
the probability that V sH exceeds V sF. The share of s-workers in F is determined analogi-
cally. As the diﬀerence in two Gumbel distributed variables follows a logistic distribution
(compare Anderson et. al. (1992)), the condition for a spatial equilibrium of each type of
3The type of distribution is irrelevant. But assuming a Gumbel distribution leads to a closed form
solution of the matching cost function.








− (msH − msF)

= 0 (11)
where ψ denotes either the share of skilled labor λ or the share of unskilled labor ρ/ρ in
H. ∆Vs is the diﬀerence in indirect utilities relevant for workers of skill-type s. Using Eq.
(3), ∆Vs is given by
∆Vs ≡ VsH − VsF = −α(lnPH − lnPF) + (YsH − YsF) (12)
The second and third term on the RHS of Eq. (11) capture the matching costs C(ψ).
Term three is the diﬀerence in modes and is a measure of relative regional attractiveness.
The more attractive is region H in comparison to region F, the smaller are matching
costs. The term in logs captures the impact of individual heterogeneity, whose strength is
determined by η: the greater η, the greater are matching costs. Following the empirical
literature (e.g., Carrington and Detragiache (1998), Docquier and Marfouk (2006), Borjas
et. al. (1992), Hunt (2000)), these costs are assumed to diﬀer between skilled and unskilled
labor, so that skilled labor faces lower costs than unskilled labor. On the one hand skilled
labor should have greater ease to adapt to new socio-cultural environments. On the other
hand, (score-based) immigration policies favor skilled labor rather than unskilled labor
immigration. In what follows η takes on the value ν (µ) for skilled (unskilled) labor with
ν < µ.
Using Eq. (10) and (8) in (12) and taking into account that in both regions unskilled





































. Equations S(λ) and G(ρ/ρ) are the migration
incentives of skilled and unskilled labor net of mobility costs. The two equations in λ and
ρ/ρ determine simultaneously and unambiguously the spatial equilibria. To analyze
10the stability of the equilibria deﬁned by Eq. (13), it is assumed that skilled labor takes
the initiative to deviate from a spatial equilibrium, whereas unskilled labor is assumed to
follow. The approach is motived by the fact that skilled workers face less matching costs
and, therefore, have greater ease to choose their region of residence4. For any distribution
of skilled labor, the equilibrium share of unskilled labor is given by solving G(ρ/ρ) in Eq.
(13) with respect to ρ/ρ:
ρ(∆VU)
ρ
= {1 + exp[(−∆VU − ∆mρ)/µ]}
−1 (14)
Here, ∆VU = ∆VU(λ,φ) represents the migration incentive of unskilled labor as deﬁned
by Eq. (12). Using Eq. (14) in S(λ) yields the equilibrium condition of skilled labor
taking into account the reaction of unskilled workers S(λ) = S(λ, ρ(λ,φ), φ).
3.1 Model forces and their interplay
Assume for now that there are no diﬀerences in regional attractiveness except individual
heterogeneity, so that msH = msF. Consequently, the symmetric allocation of skilled
and unskilled labor is always an equilibrium (S(λ = 0.5) = 0). The stability of this
equilibrium is revealed by the sign of the ﬁrst derivative of S(λ) with respect to λ evaluated
























where ∆lnP ≡ lnPH − lnPF and ∆R ≡ RH − RF. The analytical expressions of the
linkages can be found in appendix A. The ﬁrst expression is the supply linkage. When λ
rises the price index in H falls, because more varieties are produced domestically and do
not have to be imported. In F the opposite holds true, which leads to a greater migration
incentive for skilled labor toward H. The second term of Eq. (15) can be decomposed
into two diﬀerent forces (compare Pﬂüger and Südekum (2008)). Firstly, holding the
individual demand per good constant, an increase in λ leads to a bigger domestic market
4Alternatively, unskilled labor could take the initiative to deviate from a spatial equilibrium, whereas
skilled labor follows according its equation of motion. But the results and insights can be shown to be
identical.
11and higher proﬁts. This increases the attractiveness of region H (demand linkage by
skilled labor). Secondly, holding the market size constant, the lower price index in H
relatively increases the price of a variety in region H. Consequently, people demand
less units per variety, which lowers the proﬁt of domestic ﬁrms making the region less
attractive (competition eﬀect). The third term of the LHS of Eq. (15) is the demand
linkage by unskilled labor which originates in unskilled labor mobility. An increase in λ
raises the migration incentive of unskilled workers as the price index drops in H and rises
in F. The gap in regional price levels then increases the share of unskilled labor residing in
H and increases the domestic market. This in turn raises domestic proﬁts and the wages
of the skilled workforce. Summarizing, there are three forces which foster agglomeration,
whereas the competition serves as dispersion force. The fourth term of Eq. (15) reﬂects
the fact that skilled workers face matching costs. Migration is proﬁtable if the increase
in real wages outweighs the marginal costs associated with it.
Eq. (13) and (15) show that the migration incentive (terms one to three) can be additively
separated from migration costs (term four). The migration incentive of skilled labor is
a function of the degree of unskilled labor mobility (µ) and its relative population size
(ρ). The mobility parameter µ inﬂuences the relative strength of the demand linkage by
unskilled labor and the competition eﬀect. If µ > α/(σ −1), the (dispersive) competition
eﬀect is stronger than the (agglomerative) demand linkage by unskilled workers at any level
of trade costs. The relative population size ρ determines by how much the competition
eﬀect exceeds the demand linkage. If ρ is great (ρ > ρt, see appendix B), the net dispersion
force is strong leading to a migration incentive at symmetry (bold lines) as shown by Fig.
1a. The ﬁgure plots the level of trade freeness against the marginal migration incentive
at λ = 0.5. The migration incentive is negative for high levels of trade costs, but becomes
positive once trade costs have fallen below a critical threshold. The smaller the relative
population size of unskilled workers, the less important are the competition eﬀect and
the demand linkage by unskilled workers. Consequently, the (agglomerative) supply and
demand linkage by skilled labor gain strength. The latter forces are the stronger, the
higher are trade costs (see appendix A). Fig. 1b shows the corresponding migration
incentive for ρt/2σ < ρ < ρt. The migration incentive of skilled labor is positive for any
12level of trade costs and exhibits a maximum in φ ∈ [0,1]. For ρ < ρt/2σ the migration
incentive is positive for all levels of trade costs but downward-sloping in φ ∈ [0,1] as
depicted in Fig 1c. Next, assume that µ < α/(σ − 1). The demand linkages by skilled
and unskilled labor then overcompensate the competition eﬀect. Agglomeration forces
prevail so that the migration incentive for skilled labor is positive but steadily decreasing
in φ ∈ [0,1]. See also Fig. 1c.
[Figures 1a to 1c about here]
Next the impact of matching costs for skilled labor is considered. At symmetry the
marginal costs are given by 4ν, which is constant (see appendix A). The dashed horizontal
lines in Figs. 1a to 1c reﬂect diﬀerent values of these costs. The intersections between
migration incentive and the marginal migration cost curves are the break point (i.e., the
level of trade costs at which a symmetric allocation becomes unstable) and the redispersion
point (i.e., the level of trade costs at agglomeration becomes unstable). If marginal costs
are greater than the migration incentive, the population is dispersed. Otherwise, we
observe (partial) agglomeration. Analytically, the two critical thresholds are determined
by setting Eq. (15) evaluated at symmetry equal to zero and solving it for φ:
φb =
µ(σ − 1)[α(1 + ρ) − νσ] − α2ρ −
√
Z
µ[ν(σ − 1)σ − α(2 + ρ − (3 + ρ)σ)] − α2ρ
(16)
φr =
µ(σ − 1)[α(1 + ρ) − νσ] − α2ρ +
√
Z
µ[ν(σ − 1)σ − α(2 + ρ − (3 + ρ)σ)] − α2ρ
(17)





2 + 4νρ(σ − 1)σ

− 4µν(1 + ρ)(σ − 1)
2σ

where φb (φr) is the break (redispersion) point. Whether and which of these two thresholds
is real and lies in the inteval φ ∈ [0,1], depends on the degree of matching costs of both
types of labor, µ and ν, as well as the relative population size ρ. Table 1 summarizes the
results.
Parameter values are displayed in appendix B. Whenever ν is greater than the upper
bound νmax, the migration incentive is always less than the marginal migration costs for
13Table 1: Overview of parameter restrictions
µ case ρ νmin νmax
µ > α/(σ − 1) (a) ρ > ρt 0 ν
(b) ρt/2σ < ρ < ρt ν ν
(c) ρ < ρt/2σ 0 ν
µ < α/(σ − 1) (d) ρ > 0 0 ν
all levels of trade costs so that dispersion is the only stable equilibrium5. Therefore,
neither the break nor the redispersion point exist. If in cases (a) and (b) it holds true
that νmin < ν < νmax, both the break and redispersion point lie in the interval φ ∈
[0,1]. Consequently, we observe dispersion - agglomeration - redispersion in the process
of economic integration. If in case (b) the level of skilled migration costs is smaller than
the lower threshold νmin, only φr is in φ ∈ [0,1]. Consequently, even at high levels of trade
costs, the economy is (partially) agglomerated in either region. Economic integration then
leads to further agglomeration before redispersion is observed . In cases (c) and (d) the
greatest migration incentive is observed at high levels of trade costs. As long as migration
costs of skilled labor are lower than νmax reported in Table 1, only φr is in φ ∈ [0,1] so
that we also observe agglomeration for high levels of trade costs. Falling trade cost lead
to redispersion.
The comparative statics of the break and redispersion point are straightforward: ∂φb/∂α <
0 and ∂φr/∂α > 0 which is due to stronger agglomerative forces as heterogeneous goods
get more weight in the utility function, ∂φb/∂µ > 0 and ∂φr/∂µ < 0 meaning weaker ag-
glomerative forces as the unskilled demand linkage becomes less important. With respect
to changes in the elasticity of substitution, we ﬁnd that ∂φb/∂σ > 0 and ∂φr/∂σ < 0 since
agglomeration forces become weaker as ﬁrms have less market power and lower mark-ups
over marginal costs. And ﬁnally, we have ∂φb/∂ρ > 0 and ∂φr/∂ρ < 0, if migration costs
of unskilled labor µ are greater than α/(σ−1). The competition eﬀect then outweighs the
demand linkage of unskilled labor, so that a greater number of unskilled labor strengthens
the dispersive competition eﬀect. Otherwise, we ﬁnd that ∂φb/∂ρ < 0 and ∂φr/∂ρ > 0.
5The value 4νmax corresponds with the greatest value of migration incentive in the interval φ ∈ [0,1].
143.2 The patterns of regional development
3.2.1 Skilled labor agglomeration
The focus of this section is to highlight the interaction between the migration incentive of
skilled labor and its matching costs graphically6. This graphical-intuitive approach was
ﬁrst used by Ludema and Wooton (1999) and has proven to be a usefool tool in analyzing
more complex agglomeration models. Recall that in Eq. (13) the matching costs of skilled
labor (MCλ in short) can be separated additively from the migration incentive (MIλ in
short). Consequently, the two curves can be depicted separately in a single diagram. As
in Ludema and Wooton (1999) a spatial equilibrium is obtained at points of intersection
between MIλ and MCλ. The stability of such an equilibrium is revealed by the slopes of
the respective curves. Whenever the slope of MCλ is greater (smaller) than the slope of
MIλ at a point of intersection, the spatial equilibrium is (un-)stable.
Fig. 2a and 3a show the migration incentive curve as well as the cost curve for diﬀerent
values of trade costs and structural parameters. MCλ is independent of trade costs and
is upward sloping in the whole interval λ ∈ [0,1]. The greater ν, the steeper is the curve.
When λ tends to 1 (0), MCλ tends to (negative) inﬁnity. For msH = msF and λ = 0.5,
MCλ takes the value zero. When the relative attractiveness of region H (F) increases,
i.e. msH > (<)msF, MCλ shifts downward (upward).
The shape of MIλ depends on the degree of unskilled labor mobility µ as well as the relative
stock of unskilled labor ρ. For parameters of case (a) in Table 1 and µ > µcrit > α/(σ−1)
(see appendix B), MIλ is concave around λ = 0.5 and is as shown by Fig. 2a. At high
levels of trade costs MIλ is downward-sloping, but economic integration increases the
migration incentive. Once the break point is reached, falling trade costs lead to a smooth
and reversible transition from dispersion to partial agglomeration. Further reductions
of trade costs reduce the migration incentive and lead to redispersion of skilled labor.
Once trade costs have fallen below the redispersion point, dispersion is the only stable
equilibrium. The resulting pattern of regional development is bubble-shapedas shown in
6Analytically, the type of agglomeration pattern is determined by the sign of the third derivative of
the migration incentive S(λ) with respect to λ evaluated at the critical levels of trade costs φb and φr.
Appendix B shows these measures.
15Fig. 2b. Case (b) yields qualitatively similar results, if ν < ν < ν. Observe that complete
agglomeration never is an equilibrium, because MCλ tends to (negative) inﬁnity when λ
tends to 1 (0).
[Figures 2a and 2b about here]
If unskilled labor faces small mobility costs so that α/(σ−1) < µ < µcrit and the relative
population size of unskilled labor exceeds a certain threshold ρ > ρcrit > ρt (see appendix
B), MIλ is convex around symmetry and is as shown by Fig. 3a. The evolution of MIλ
with respect to falling trade costs is similar to the above: At high (low) levels of trade
costs, economic integration makes MIλ rotate counterclockwise (clockwise). The interplay
of MIλ and MCλ leads to a set of regional distribution patterns as described in Ludema
and Wooton (1999) and Basevi (1999). The probably most prominent shape of economic
distribution is the spearhead as shown in Fig. 3b. But while Ludema and Wooton
(1999) have to rely on simulations and intuitive guesses to determine to resulting shape
of economic distribution, this paper provides analytical measures which unambiguously
reveal the type of agglomeration pattern (see appendix B).
[Figures 3a and 3b about here]
Fig. 4 shows the resulting distribution of skilled labor of case (b), if matching costs of
skilled labor are relatively small so that ν < νmin. Partial agglomeration prevails even at
very high levels of trade costs. Falling trade costs ﬁrst foster the concentration of economic
activity, before redispersion is observed. A similar pattern arises in cases (c) and (d). But
here the highest degree of economic concentration is observed at (prohibitively) high levels
of trade costs. Economic integration then reduces the incentive to agglomerate and leads
to dispersion. Fig. 5 shows the corresponding distribution of economic activity.
[Figures 4 and 5 about here]
3.2.2 The distribution of unskilled labor
Once the equilibrium share of skilled labor is determined, one can derive the equilibrium
distribution of unskilled labor at any level of trade costs by using ρ∗/ρ = ρ∗/ρ(λ∗(φ),φ)
16described by Eq. (14)7. Observe that ρ/ρ follows a logistic probability function with
the migration incentive for unskilled labor ∆VU being the argument. As the migration
incentive of unskilled labor is monotonically increasing in the degree of skilled labor ag-
glomeration, there is a positive one-to-one relationship between skilled and unskilled labor
distribution agglomeration. It follows that both types of labor agglomerate in the same
region.
[Figures 6a and 6b about here]
Figs. 6a and 6b show the evolution of unskilled labor concentration (black lines) and the
skilled labor agglomeration (gray lines) with respect to falling trade costs. As long as
skilled labor is dispersed, unskilled labor is equally split between regions, as well. Once
trade costs have fallen below the breakpoint φb, skilled and, therefore, unskilled labor
agglomeration becomes stable. If skilled labor agglomeration is smooth and reversible
(catastrophic) as described in Fig. 2b (2c), unskilled labor agglomeration is smooth
(catastrophic), as well. Falling trade costs have two opposing eﬀects on the migration












The ﬁrst term of the RHS of Eq. (18) reﬂects the fact that economic integration changes
the pattern of skilled labor agglomeration as shown by Figs. 2b to 5. The second ex-
pression shows that falling trade costs reduce the diﬀerence in domestic price levels so
that the migration incentive of unskilled labor decreases. As long as λ∗ is increasing in
φ, these two forces oppose each other. Due to symmetry in price levels at dispersion,
the overall eﬀect of economic integration on the migration incentive of unskilled labor at
the break point is positive (because ∂∆VU/∂φ(λ = 0.5) = 0). Consequently, around φb
the share of unskilled labor ρ∗/ρ is increasing in φ. Once skilled labor agglomeration has
peaked in either region, both forces act into the same direction leading to redispersion of
7Keep in mind that λ∗ and ρ∗/ρ are simultaneously determined. The proceeding merely highlights
the relation between skilled and unskilled agglomeration.
17the unskilled workforce. When trade costs fall below the redispersion point, dispersion of
both skilled and unskilled labor is the only stable equilibrium.
The relative distribution of both types of labor depends on the degree of mobility of the
unskilled workforce. Recall that λ∗ determines the migration incentive of unskilled labor
(MIρ), which is in upward-sloping function in λ∗ and intersects the matching cost function
of unskilled (MCρ) only once at λ∗ = ρ∗/ρ = 0.5. As unskilled workers migrate until MCρ
equals MIρ, the relative distribution of labor is determined unambiguously by the relative
position of these two functions. It can be shown that when unskilled labor is relatively
immobile, i.e. µ > α/(σ − 1), the share of skilled workers exceeds the share of unskilled
labor in the agglomeration core. If unskilled labor is relatively homogeneous and mobile,
i.e. µ < α/(σ − 1) there exists a set of parameters at which the share of unskilled labor
is greater than the share of skilled workers.
4 Policy implications
Governments seek to inﬂuence the skill pattern of immigrants: migration policies usually
prefer skilled labor immigration, while trying to impede the inﬂow of unskilled work-
ers. Here, governmental migration impediments (incentives) are understood as measures
which increase (lower) the costs of living in a particular region: formal bureaucratic du-
ties like periodical renewal procedures for visa, participation constraints for social welfare
programs, or residence authorizations and work permissions for spouses and other family
members. This aim of this section is to oﬀers a positive analysis of the impact of each of
these policy measures under increasing returns to scale.
Consider an economy in a stable spatial equilibrium and assume (w.l.o.g.) that there is
partial agglomeration in H (λ∗ > 0.5), which the government in H wants to foster while at
the same time impeding the immigration of unskilled labor. Pro-skilled immigration poli-
cies reduce the costs of skilled migrants and make migration more proﬁtable. Analytically,
this can be represented by greater values of mλ,H or lower values of ν. Changes in ν aﬀect
individuals diﬀerently, especially those who have the highest costs gain most8. Varying
8Observe that dC(λ)/dν = lnλ/(1 − λ), which is an increasing function in λ.
18mλ,H, instead, aﬀects everyone equally. Here, we follow (w.o.l.g.) the latter and represent
political migration impediments (incentives) by changes in distributional modes9. Ceteris
paribus, lowering the costs for skilled migrants increases the net immigration incentive
S(λ) and leads to a higher equilibrium share of skilled labor (dλ∗/dmλ,H > 0). But pro-
skilled immigration policies induce a second eﬀect further enhancing skilled labor immigra-
tion: As the equilibrium share λ∗ increases, the immigration incentive for unskilled labor
increases, as well. Analytically, we ﬁnd dG(λ∗)/dmλ,H = (∂G/∂λ∗)(dλ∗/dmλ,H) > 0.
Consequently, the equilibrium share of unskilled labor ρ∗/ρ rises, which increases the do-
mestic market, raises proﬁts of domestic ﬁrms and implies a positive feedback on skilled
immigration. The overall eﬀect of pro-skilled migration policies on the immigration in-














where the ﬁrst term on the RHS captures the direct impact of lower costs and the second
term embraces the indirect eﬀect through unskilled labor immigration. Both forces work
into the same direction. Graphically, pro-skilled migration policies shift MCλ downwards
as shown by Fig. 7. Consequently, the equilibrium share of skilled labor increases. Note
that by construction MIλ already takes into account the positive feedback by unskilled
labor immigration.
In analogy to the above, contra-unskilled immigration policies lead to tougher migration
impediments and are equivalent to lower values of mρ,H. Ceteris paribus, the propensity of
unskilled workers to migrate decreases. Analytically, it holds true that dG(ρ∗/ρ)/dmρ,H >
0, so that the equilibrium share of the unskilled workforce ρ∗/ρ becomes smaller. This in
turn has an impact on the equilibrium level of skilled workers - due to a smaller market
and domestic aggregate income, proﬁts of domestic ﬁrms decrease making the domestic









9Qualitative results can be shown to be identical irrespectively of which parameter is aﬀected.
19Consequently, the equilibrium share of skilled labor decreases (dλ∗/dmρ,H < 0), which has
a negative feedback on the equilibrium distribution of unskilled workers. Summarizing,
the overall eﬀect of contra-unskilled migration policies on the immigration incentive of














The ﬁrst term on the RHS of Eq. (21) captures the direct eﬀect by migration impedi-
ments. The second term embraces the indirect eﬀect via changes in the equilibrium size
of skilled labor. Both forces reduce the migration incentive of unskilled workers. Graphi-
cally, contra-unskilled migration policies shift MIλ downwards: a lower share of unskilled
labor reduces the migration incentive of skilled workers independently of their spatial
distribution as shown by Fig. 8. Consequently, the equilibrium share of skilled labor
decreases.
The impact of skill-biased immigration policies is straightforward. Lower impediments for
skilled migrants increase the immigration incentive for both skilled and unskilled work-
ers. But increased obstacles for unskilled workers impede unskilled labor immigration and
reduce the immigration incentives of skilled labor. Graphically, the counterproductive im-
pact of these policy measure can be depicted by shifting both MIλ and MCλ downwards.
The overall impact on the migration incentives of both types of labor and their spatial
distribution depends on the actual policy design. But it becomes clear that these two
policies attenuate each other and can even lead to counterproductive outcomes. So, if the
impact of contra-unskilled policies is suﬃciently strong, so that the migration incentive
of skilled labor is lowered by more then it is enhanced by pro-skilled policies, a new equi-
librium with a smaller domestic share of skilled and unskilled labor may arise. It is also
possible that pro-skilled migration policies increase the migration incentive of unskilled
labor to such an extent that it overcomes the impediments introduced by contra-unskilled
policies. Consequently, skill-biased migration policies may also lead to a new equilibrium
with a greater share of both skilled and unskilled labor.
20Furthermore, it can be shown that the eﬀectiveness of migration policies depends on the

































Here, dλ∗/dmλ,H can be interpreted as a measure of eﬀectiveness of pro-skilled migration
policies. According to Eq. (22) it depends on the evolution of the marginal migration
incentive in equilibrium (i.e., the slope of MIλ∗). As in section 3.1 the marginal migration
incentive can be interpreted as a measure of the relative strength of agglomeration and
deglomeration forces. At high levels of trade costs, deglomeration forces are dominant so
that migration impediments have to be relaxed strongly to induce migration. Economic
integration raises the relative strength of agglomeration forces which boost the impact of
policy measures promoting the inﬂow of skilled labor. At low levels of trade costs, spatial
issues and agglomeration forces become less and non-monetary factors (heterogeneity)
become more important in the choice of location, so that policy measures have less impact
on the migration decision. Qualitatively identical results can be shown to hold true for
the eﬀectiveness of contra-unskilled migration policies.
5 Conclusion
This paper has developed an agglomeration model with two mobile types of workers. In-
dividuals are heterogeneous both within skill types and between skill groups. Heterogene-
ity reﬂects the fact that workers have diﬀerent preferences over locations, heterogeneous
costs from being remote from one’s own socio-cultural surrounding or diﬀerent obstacles
to migration. The model has been used to analyze the impact and the eﬀectiveness of
skill-biased migration policies in settings where market sizes play a signiﬁcant role.
21Five central market and non-market forces, which give rise to regional agglomeration pat-
tern, have been worked out. Firstly, an inﬂow of skilled labor shifts production toward the
immigration area and increases the gap in regional price levels (supply linkage). Secondly,
the inﬂow of skilled labor increases the domestic market size and domestic aggregate in-
come making domestic ﬁrms more proﬁtable (demand linkage by skilled labor). But the
creation of new ﬁrms also increases competition for costumers, which lowers proﬁts of
domestic ﬁrms and decreases the immigration incentive of skilled labor (competition ef-
fect). Fourthly, the shift in production and the rising gap in regional price level induce
the inﬂow of unskilled workers. The latter raise the domestic aggregate income, increasing
proﬁts of domestic ﬁrms (demand linkage by unskilled labor). Furthermore, both skilled
and unskilled labor face mobility costs which act as (non-market) dispersion force.
The geographical distribution of skilled and unskilled workers depends on two sets of
parameters. On the one hand, trade costs. When trade costs are greater than a criti-
cal threshold (break point) or less than a lower critical value (redispersion point), only
the symmetric distribution of both factor of production is stable. If trade costs are in
between these thresholds, regional symmetry becomes instable giving rise to partial ag-
glomeration of skilled and unskilled labor in the same region. On the other hand, it is the
level of matching costs of both types of labor which inﬂuences the pattern of economic
distribution. Here, two diﬀerent eﬀects have to be distinguished. Firstly, lower matching
costs for any type of labor increase its net value of migration, which fosters its regional
concentration. Secondly, there is an inverse relationship between matching costs of one
type of labor and the migration incentive of the other, which is an important feature of
the model: The smaller are migration impediments of unskilled employees, the stronger is
the immigration incentive for skilled labor. The intuition originates in the home market
eﬀect - lower impediments to unskilled labor migration induce its inﬂows, increasing the
domestic market and aggregate income. Larger markets, in turn, make domestic ﬁrms
more proﬁtable and lead to higher skilled wages. Consequently, the regional concentra-
tion of skilled labor increases for any given level of trade costs and migration impediments
for skilled labor. The same holds true with respect to migration impediments for skilled
workers: lowering migration impediments for skilled labor, enhances the inﬂow of skilled
22labor. The shift in production towards the immigration country increases real wages of
unskilled workers for any level of unskilled migration impediments. The resulting inﬂow
of unskilled migrants leads to a positive feedback on the migration incentive of skilled
workers, so that we observe the same eﬀects on the degree of spatial agglomeration as
described above.
Summarizing we have the following: pro-skilled policies increase the immigration incen-
tive of skilled and unskilled labor, contra-unskilled measures decrease the incentives for
both types. Consequently, it is the interdependency and mutual reinforcement of skilled
and unskilled labor migration which attenuates the eﬀectiveness of skill-biased migration
policies or, depending on the design, even leads to counterproductive policy outcomes.
But not only the policy mix is a determinant of the eﬀectiveness of skill-biased migration
policies, but also the level of trade costs. Migration policies are most eﬀective at medium
levels of trade costs, while at high and low levels of trade costs they loose inﬂuence on
the migration decision. At high levels of trade costs, migration leads to losses in real
wages as deglomeration forces dominate. Migration policies have to overcome them. If
markets are well integrated, agglomeration forces are weak so that non-market determine
the location decision. At medium levels of trade costs, migration policies are fostered by
agglomeration forces, so that their impact is boosted.
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24A Model forces and breakpoint
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µ(σ − 1)σ(1 + φ)2 > 0 (26)
• Marginal migration costs of skilled labor:
∂C
∂λ
   
λ=1/2
= 4ν (27)
The sum of competition eﬀect and demand linkage of unskilled labor : Eq. (25)+(26):
DLU + CE |λ=1/2 =
4α[ρ[α − µ(σ − 1)] − µ(σ − 1)]
µ(σ − 1)σ(1 + φ)2 (28)
For µ > α/(σ −1) this expression is less than zero for any given value of ρ. Furthermore,
the ﬁrst derivate with respect to ρ is then negative. A greater number of unskilled labor
increases the relative strength of the competition eﬀect.
The sum of the demand linkage of both skilled and unskilled labor as well as the compe-
tition eﬀect: Eq. (24)+(25)+(26):
DLS + DLU + CE |λ=1/2 =
4α(1 − φ)(αρ(1 − φ) − µ(σ − 1)(ρ(1 − φ) − 2φ))
µ(σ − 1)σ(1 + φ)2 (29)
If µ < α/(σ − 1), this expression is positive for any given amount of unskilled labor ρ.
Consequently, the agglomeration forces prevail. The ﬁrst derivative with respect to ρ
25reveals that that the net agglomeration forces become stronger, the greater the unskilled
workerforce.
B Critical parameter values
ρt = µσ/(µ(σ − 1) − α) (30)
ν =
αµ(2σ − 1)2
4[µ(ρ + 1)(σ − 1) − αρ](σ − 1)σ
(31)
ν =














α2(σ(20σ − 12) + 1)
(σ − 1)2σ2 (34)




λ (λ = 0.5,φc) = −
32(α2ρ[α2 − 4µ2(σ − 1)2](1 − φc)4 − F(1 − φc)3)
µ3(σ − 1)3σ(1 + φc)4 − 32ν (35)
where φc ∈ {φb,φr} and F = αµ3(σ − 1)2 [σ − 3ρ(σ − 1)(1 − φc) + (7σ − 6)φc].
If S
(3)
λ (λ = 0.5,φc) < 0(> 0), the transition between dispersion and agglomeration at φc
is smooth (catastrophic).











































Figure 1c  







































Figure 2b – Bubble bifurcation (numerical evaluation for  000003 . 0 , 9 . 0 , 150 , 2 , 5 . 0 = ν = μ = ρ = σ = α ) 
 
 


















































































































































































Figure 5 - numerical evaluation for  1245 . 0 , 6 . 0 , 3 , 2 , 5 . 0 = ν = μ = ρ = σ = α  
 
 

















lFigure 6a – The distribution of skilled (black lines) and unskilled labor (gray lines) 
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Figure 6b – The distribution of skilled (black lines) and unskilled labor (gray lines) 
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Figure 8  - The impact of contra-unskilled migration policies 
 
 
 
 
 
 